The article presents a brief description of the ELINT Subsystem (PR Subsystem) included in the Integrated Air Electronic Warfare Range (IAEWR), created as part of a development project co-financed by the National Center for Research and Development. Typical ELINT class devices used in the Polish Armed Forces were implemented in the design of the PR subsystem. In particular, the authors of the paper focus on presenting the role of PR Subsystem in the process of assessing the effectiveness of registered radio-electronic jamming signals generated from an aircraft platform. This will allow for the future implementation of aviation training tasks, including the assessment of the correctness of the crew's and the aircraft's built-in defense system response to simulated electromagnetic emissions (radar threats). The article also presents the adopted criteria for the detection and classification of selected types of radio electronic interference, including narrowband noise jamming, wideband noise jamming, Range Gate Pull Off, Range False Targets and Square Swept Wave. The article describes the basic features of the above-mentioned types of interference and the general principles of detection and registration.
INTRODUCTION
In present article was introduced the ELINT Subsystem (ES) which is a part of EW Training Range (the SSPWE system), making up on basis of contract of realization of developmental project with National Centre of Research and Development (NCBR). The SSPWE system be designed to support of process of training aircraft crews in conditions of electronic warfare (EW) across creation approximate to real, microwave electromagnetic environment, and to obtain the information about reaction of crew on linked by conditions also. The SSPWE system will offer a real opportunity to be the complete system in the future, capable to ensuring approximate to real microwave threats for aircraft crews in time of flight. Further, are presented some radar jamming which are applied to electronic dazzling/disruption preliminary search and tracking radars used by missile/ the anti-aircraft artillery and airborne radars mounted on board the multi-role fighter aircraft. Moreover, the conception of jamming classification by ELINT Subsystem was introduced. This concept is based on unique recorded features, attributed to the individual kinds of radar jamming. 1 jaroslaw.florczak@itwl.pl; www.itwl.pl
Basic description of the ELINT Subsystem
Within the SSPWE system are three basic functional items [1] :
-Management and Cooperation Unit (the JZW), -Generation of Threats Unit (the JGZ), -Surveillance -Measuring Unit (the JOP).
ELINT Subsystem is a part of the Surveillance -Measuring Unit. [1] The Generation of Threats Unit (JGZ) will include:
1. The Generation subsystem which will be able to generation, amplification and directed emission of threat signal.
2. The Power supply subsystem will assure e.g. power supply control for other subsystem and will contain Exchange Data unit which will perform communication tasks between other system items.
The Surveillance -Measuring Unit (JOP) will include:
1. The Surveillance Subsystem based on long range IFF interrogator which will be modified for the needs of the project, it will conduct location an aircraft equipped in mode 3/A and C transponder MARK X in controlled airspace.
2. The ELINT Subsystem will analyze and measure jamming bandwidth, jamming direction and also analyze jamming efficiency level by self-protection equipment of aircraft in controlled airspace.
Power supply subsystem (description as above).

The Management and Cooperation Unit (JZW) will include:
1. The Management subsystem which will conduct configuration control, as well as the steering, diagnostics control but, first of all, will be monitoring the training operation.
2. The Optoelectronic subsystem will conduct wide range observation of an aerial object and aiming devices with laser, night vision and thermal vision technologies in controlled area; used video tracker and laser rangefinder to determine the position of the indicated an air object.
3. The Cooperation subsystem will be receiving quick radiolocation information from co-operating sources equipped in specialized adapter and other system involving control, diagnostic and receiving data from other unit. 4. The Registration subsystem will conduct data recording referred to training additionally data time marked and will be a source of time for SSPWE system.
5.
The MILNET-Z station will conduct classified data processing according to safety documentation.
Power supply subsystem (description as above).
It is supposed that staff of projected SSPWE system will execute all tasks during a training from Management and Cooperation positions whereas other items will be remotely controlled.
The Microwave MIZAR sets receivers which are the main part of ELINT Subsystem allows a large frequency range (e.g., 2 to 18 GHz) to be covered in bands. Their main task is to register activity of source of emission (using monitoring channel) as well as the parametric estimation and bearings (direction finding) of indicated sources of emission (using location channel). Registered data will be sent after processing to the Management and Cooperation Unit as auxiliary data for training evaluation process.
REVIEW OF SELECTED JAMMING TECHNIQUES
Active jamming used to suppress/dazzling the enemy's electromagnetic signals emitted from radars can divide on two principle kind:
-Cover Jamming;
-Deceptive Jamming.
Cover Jamming
The object of cover jamming is to reduce the quality of the signal output. There are following techniques inside cover jamming:
wideband noise: generic jamming band cover a numerous radar receiver channels. With regard on jamming bandwidth it fulfils the following condition [2] : 
Deception Jamming
Deception Jamming -(basic type of jamming used in Self-protection Systems) are intentional jamming imitating real return signals on victim radar's scope. Undoubtedly, the main advantage of using the deception jamming is the reduced capability of radar receiving systems to filter out this type of jamming signals. Matching of false waveforms in terms of carrier frequency and (in the case of using DRFM) the instantaneous phase, significantly impedes the possibility of separating the false targets from the real targets. Due to the frequency and phase matching, the requirements for the J/S ratio [5] are reduced. There are many types of deception jamming.
This article is presented selected types [8]:
1. Numerous range false targets (RFT), 2. RGPO, RGPI -Range Gate Pull-Out/In, 3. Angular deception jamming (SSW-Square-Swept-Wave).
Numerous range false targets (RFT)
RFT technique involves the synchronous generation of series of pulses on the carrier frequency of a threat signal with a similar pulse duration. making difficulties in selecting target for tracking, capturing real return signal by Cover Pulse [3] , forcing AGC systems to lower the input signal gain level, which will make in turn more difficult to receive real return from the target [5] .
Range Gate Pull Off, Range Gate Pull In
The RGPO, RGPI techniques are based on delaying (RGPO) or accelerating (RGPI) the generated pulse relative to the actual return of the tracked target. Figure 5 . Range Gate Pull Off Technique [3] CHAPTER 38: Electronic Attack 547 is the generation of false tarnd-off or stand-in) is the gene false targets do not break ut they can saturate a radar's gnificantly reducing the capatargets can have pulse comoppler signatures. They can radar or radar scan in some cribed below are not effec-. This is because monopulse n from each pulse, and these tiple pulses. Some will actuking performance in mono-38-14 shows the timing of e target. Range gate pull-off ing the enemy radar pulses imal delay. Then subsequent asing amount. The delay time xponentially. This delays the the enemy radar in a pattern rget is turning away from the 5, the delayed pulses load up the radar-range tracking cirge to the target is greater than jamming pulses increases to ack to zero-repeatedly. This track on the target. Another nge gate stealing) is shown in o a mode in which it tracks on pulses, the range tracker will lses and continue to track the ng that another jamming tech- Figure 5 shows the principle of generating the RGPO technique. False target pulse responsible for "gate stealing" is generated with increasing time delay in every pulse repetition interval. The system generating the range gate error signal compares amount of energy within "Early Gate" and in the "Late Gate", then the system initiates a movement of the tracking gate towards the further gate to compensate the energy level [6] . This process continue until the gate leaves the range of the radar resolution cell of the target. Figure 6 . RGPO technique in space [3] As a result of breaking the tracking process the radar is forced to change the operational mode to the target search mode. "Pushing" the range gate closer the tracking radar in a similar way mentioned above is called RGPI technique. The only difference is the opposite direction of the changes. Figure 7 . Range Gate Pull In technique [3] The RGPI technique enforce having sufficiently large knowledge about the transmitting characteristics of the victim radar and onboard emission tracking systems (Pulse Repetition Interval Tracker) to predict the arrival time of subsequent threat pulses [5] .
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antenna beamwidth (i.e., twice the sine of half of the antenna's 3-dB beamwidth multiplied by the range from the radar to the target). The process of tracking a target can be thought of as trying to keep the target centered in a resolution cell. By moving the range gate out in time, the range gate pull-off jammer moves the resolution cell away from the target, as shown in Figure  9 .19. When the real target is outside the resolution cell, the radar track has been broken.
Pull-Off Rate
An important consideration is how fast the jammer can pull the range gate away from the target. Obviously, the faster the range gate is moved, the better the protection. However, if the pull-off rate exceeds the radar's tracking rate, the jamming will fail. If you don't know anything about the design of the radar being jammed, you can set this limit by considering the job the radar is designed to do. The radar must be able to track the maximum rate of change of the target range (i.e., the target moving directly toward or away from the radar), and to change its range tracking rate at the maximum rate of change of the range rate (i.e., the range acceleration).
Counter-Countermeasures
Two counter-countermeasures are effective against range gate pull-off jamming. One is simply to increase the radar's power so that the true skin return dominates the return signal tracking. This is in effect what happens at the "burn-through" range. The second is to use leading-edge tracking. Consider the actual signal received by the radar during range gate pull-off 
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Range Gate Pull-In. against leading edge rate (PRF) tracker to sequent pulse and to before the skin retur Figure 38 -17. This te (RGPI) or inbound ra time for the jammin parabolically or exp target is turning towa thus concludes that t This loads up the ear as shown in Figure 3 future pulses be calc radars with fixed or s use randomly jittered Cover Pulses. While pulses are covered knowledge of the exa target. As shown in received radar pulse 38-20 shows range b cover pulses and is u vents the radar from while achieving incre to continuous jammi ing. For radars which be expanded to cove jamming efficiency. Figure 38-18. The strong jamming pulses from range gate pull-in jamming increase the power in the radar's early gate, causing the radar to pull in its range estimate away from the actual target.
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Angular deception jamming (Square Swept Wave)
The angular deception jamming technique implementation (also known as Swept Wave Modulation)
base on rectangular wave with the constant or modulated frequency and/or duty cycle. decreasing the angle measurement accuracy of mono-pulse measurement direction methods.
RADAR JAMMING SIGNAL DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
The nature of jamming signals generated from a typical Airborne Electronic Attack or Self-Protection device is not similar to typical radar signals. Detection of such signals with a classic ELINT system is a demanding process. Proper measurement of jamming signals is possible only with particular and special care for the configuration parameters of the ELINT receivers (appropriate LIN/LOG amplifiers, fine thresholds and optimal IF bandwidths). Detection of amplitude/angle deception signals may be complicated due to high dynamic level.
Classification of detected jamming signals bases on two data streams:
-Bandwidth occupancy of signals detected in the monitoring channel, -Time and power features of pulses estimated within the Pulse Descriptor Word from the Direction Finder (DF) channel.
Monitoring channel data
It is assumed that the bandwidth occupation analysis should be done first. According to Figure 10 it is assumed that the masking and deception jamming signals are distinguished on the basis of bandwidth occupancy coefficient. Due to ability of generating various techniques variable with time, it is necessary to define a sliding window with variable width. The bandwidth occupancy analysis will be executed again after the sliding window reached to the end of the registered sequence. Such process will allow to detect various mixed (masking and deception) jamming signals.
DF channel data
If the jamming signal within the sliding window is classified as a deception jamming, it is necessary to analyze the DF channel data stream. It is assumed that the Range Deception analysis should be done first.
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 11442 114420X-10 Figure 12 shows the graphic interpretation of PGRI. It is defined as time between the last pulse rising edge from the preceding group and the first pulse rising edge from the succeeding group.
Range Deception jamming techniques
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 11442 114420X-11 Targets (RFTs) may be described as [7] :
where: e means admissible time measurement error.
Proc. of SPIE Vol. 11442 114420X-12 Figure 15 shows the pulse repetition interval of the Range Gate Pull In technique. The gradient coefficient a is negative.
Amplitude/Angle Deception jamming techniques
The Figure 17 shows a modulated square wave in time and spectra domain. As in previous case, the strongest is the 40 Hz base frequency. A lot of odd harmonic frequencies exists. Due to the modulated duty cycle from 50% to 30% a lot of even harmonic frequencies exists.
SUMMARY
In the presented article the basic direction of work carried out during the development and implementation of the ELINT ESM subsystem is described. It will be one of the key elements of the system for assessing the correctness of the Aircraft Self-Protection system. At present, it will enable the validation of interference techniques generated on board the F-16 aircraft. In the future, its usefulness for the evaluation of interference generated on board the F-35 aircraft is also assumed. The presented list of interference is not complete, in the case of the F-16 aircraft it includes several possible generation techniques, for which the basic criterion of use is the detected type of threat signal.
